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The United States (U.S.) policy on federal prison privatization has 
recently undergone a major change. In February of 2017, the Office of the 
Attorney General issued a memorandum which rescinded the previous 
administration’s order to eliminate the use of federal private prison 
contracts.1 The original order to eliminate federal private prisons was based 
                                                          
* PhD Candidate in Social Policy at Brandeis University Heller School for Social Policy & 
Management; Faculty at Boston University and Boston College Schools of Social Work. 
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of the Society for the Study of Social Problem in August 2017. 
1 See Memorandum from Att’y Gen. Jefferson B. Sessions III on Rescission of Memorandum 
on Use of Private Prisons to Acting Dir. Fed. Bureau of Prisons (Feb. 21, 2017) [hereinafter 
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on a report by the Department of Justice’s Office of the Inspector General, 
which found that federal privately contracted prisons compared poorly with 
Bureau of Prison facilities.2 The report found that these private prisons did 
not provide substantial cost savings, had worse safety outcomes, and offered 
less rehabilitative services.3 However, under the Trump administration these 
changes were rescinded with the issuance of a new directive that swung the 
pendulum of policy back in favor of using private facilities to “meet the future 
needs of the federal correctional system.”4 Issues of safety and rehabilitation 
were not addressed in this memorandum.5 Additionally, the majority (87%) 
of the nearly million and a half prisoners in the U.S. are held in state 
facilities,6 which were not covered by the original directive.  
Meanwhile in Israel, a 2009 Israeli Supreme Court ruling found that 
private prisons were a violation of human rights.7 This dismantling of private 
prisons in Israel will be used as a case study. The legal context and use of 
private prisons in Israel will be compared to that in the U.S. Due to 
differences in legal statutes, this analysis will be focused on U.S. state and 
federal prisons, and therefore will not discuss jails/county detention facilities, 
juvenile detention facilities, or civil detention facilities (which would include 
immigration detention centers and psychiatric facilities). However, the line 
of argument presented here can likely be adapted to the context of these 
facilities.  
This Article will begin by describing the relevance of 
decommodification theory to analyzing the impact of prison privatization on 
human rights. Next, it will provide an overview of the historical 
underpinnings of prison privatization in the U.S. Then, it will present the 
Israeli Supreme Court case which struck down prison privatization. A 
comparison of relevant legal statutes between the U.S. and Israel will then 
follow. Finally, an argument will be made which details how the Israeli case 
                                                          
Sessions Memo]; see generally Memorandum from Deputy Att’y Gen. Sally Q. Yates on 
Reducing our Use of Private Prisons to Acting Dir. Fed. Bureau of Prisons (Aug. 18, 2016). 
2 EVALUATION AND INSPECTIONS DIV., U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, 16–06, REVIEW OF THE 
FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS’ MONITORING OF CONTRACT PRISONS, at 2–3 (Aug. 2016). 
3 Id. at ii-iii, 11-13. 
4 Sessions Memo, supra note 1. 
5 See id. 
6 See E. ANN CARSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 248955, PRISONERS IN 2014, at 2 (Lynne 
McConnell & Jill Thomas eds., 2015). 
7 HCJ 2605/05 Academic Center of Law & Business v. Minister of Finance, 27, 27 (2009) 
(Isr.). 
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may be applied to a U.S. context. This argument explains how prison 
privatization serves to strip prisons of the human right to dignity by 
commodifying them and transferring a core power of the state to a private 
entity. 
I. THE FRAMEWORK: FROM COST EFFECTIVENESS TO HUMAN RIGHTS 
 The line of analysis used in this Article builds on previous work by 
Dolovich, which urged a move away from the use of a comparative efficiency 
approach in the analysis of private prisons.8 In order to employ a human rights 
lens, the intersections of dignity and decommodification, as related to the 
privatization of prisons, will be examined. The use of dignity and human 
rights have been suggested as a potential legitimizer for penal reform.9 
Decommodification theory views public assets, such as prisons, as 
entitlements, not commodities.10 Furthermore, according to Epsing-
Anderson, the decommodification of individuals is necessary to grant them 
social rights.11 This is because the commodification of an individual, such as 
a prisoner in a private prison, inherently objectifies the person.12 Therefore, 
without the decommodification of individuals, there can be no right to 
dignity;13 the right to dignity denotes the special worth of a person, whereby 
they are granted human rights.14 
 Prisons may appear to be designed to curb fundamental human rights, 
such as freedom. However, according to the United Nations (UN), the role of 
a prison within a society is to encourage personal reformation and social 
rehabilitation.15 Therefore, the associated loss of freedom to prisoners does 
not signify acceptance of infringing on the human rights of prisoners. Rather, 
it signifies the use of the state’s duty to protect the human rights of its citizens, 
through initially separating and then rehabilitating prisoners. A focus on the 
                                                          
8 See generally Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437, 
544–45 (2005). 
9 See Sonja Snacken, Punishment, Legitimate Policies and Values: Penal Moderation, 
Dignity and Human Rights, 17 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 397, 398 (2015). 
10 Gøsta Esping-Anderson, The Three Political Economies of the Welfare State, 20 INT’L J. 
SOCIOLOGY 92, 105–07 (1990). 
11 See generally id. 
12 See generally id. 
13 See generally id.  
14 See generally Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of 
Human Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L., 655, 679 (2008). 
15 OFFICE OF UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
PRISONS, 9 (2005). 
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human rights of prisoners is of particular importance. Due to the nature of 
their status, prisoners are particularly vulnerable to human rights abuses. 
Evidence of abuses of prisoners’ human rights has been detailed in the 
Belmont Report, which now provides additional protections to prisoners as 
research subjects.16 While the vulnerabilities of prisoners to human rights 
abuses is certainly not new or limited to exploitation resulting from 
privatization, the particular problems of human rights violations as related to 
commodification and related financial incentives for exploitation is of 
importance.  
 It is recognized that any U.S. approach should be sensitive to the 
cultural context of the local judicial and legislative systems. However, the 
feasibility of adapting an Israeli Supreme Court strategy to the U.S. has 
potential. The Israeli and U.S. judicial systems are similar in that they were 
both adapted from the United Kingdom’s system.17 While there are some 
major differences between the two systems (no capital punishment in Israel, 
no jury system in Israel, less formal constitution), these differences do not 
impact the substance of this case study.18 Rather, in this case, the Israeli 
Supreme Court appears to have acted very similarly to the U.S. Supreme 
Court by applying a constitutional argument to nullify a law. Additionally, 
while some legal challenges have been brought against private prisons in the 
US, none have followed the argument used in Israel. Given the similarities 
between the two systems, a close comparison of how the Israeli argument 
may extent to the U.S. context is needed and will follow by describing the 
two systems. 
II. HISTORY OF PRIVATE PRISONS IN THE US 
In the early days of the US, the use of private prisons was adopted 
from England.19 Yet, by the early 1900s the state administration of secure 
correctional facilities was internationally accepted as essential to the role of 
the state.20  Despite this, there has been a growing privatization of prisons in 
                                                          
16 See Office of the Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health, Educ., and Welfare, The Belmont Report: 
Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research, J. AM. 
C. DENTISTS, Summer 2014, at 4, 9. 
17 Amnon Straschnov, The Judicial System in Israel, 34 TULSA L.J. 527, 527 (1999). 
18 Id.; see also Malvina Halberstam, Judicial Review, A Comparative Perspective: Israel, 
Canada, and the United States, 31 CARDOZA L. REV. 2393, 2431 (2010). 
19 See DOUGLAS MCDONALD ET AL., PRIVATE PRISONS IN THE UNITED STATES: AN 
ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT PRACTICE, at 4 (1998). 
20 Id. 
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the U.S. since the 1980s.21 In addition, juvenile rehabilitation, vocational 
rehabilitation, and direct service contracts continue to be held in exception to 
the state’s role.22 
As a result of the war-on-drugs and tough-on-crime policies of the 
late twentieth century, the number of U.S. prisoners began to grow rapidly, 
nearly doubling between 1988 and 1997.23 The booming U.S. prison 
population in the 1980s and 1990s created an opportunity to reevaluate the 
exclusivity of the state in administrating secure correctional facilities.24 
Private prison corporations offered to solve many of the problems created by 
the rapid growth of the prison population.25 These corporations were able to 
quickly build new facilities to expand bed capacity and offered to provide the 
same services for less cost through increased efficiencies.26 In order to take 
advantage of these strategies, some state and federal agencies began shifting 
their custodial duties towards private corporations.27 Additionally, some 
jurisdictions responded by privatizing contracts for services, but retained the 
essential duties of housing and supervision.28  
In 1992, President George H. W. Bush formalized this privatization 
strategy through an executive order that encouraged the privatization of 
prisons, and other state infrastructure assets.29 Additionally, the role of 
private prison corporations in contributing to a favorable political climate for 
private prisons cannot be ignored. Private prison corporations have been 
involved in political campaign contributions and legislative lobbying that 
supports the very policies that led to their gaining a foothold in the U.S. prison 
system in the first place.30 Their continued political presence makes them a 
powerful stakeholder in maintaining the use of private prisons in the U.S. 
                                                          
21 Id. 
22 Id. at iii. 
23 See Rachel Christine Bailie Antonuccio, Prisons for Profit: Do the Social and Political 
Problems Have a Legal Solution?, 33 J. CORP. L. 577, 579 (2007). 
24 See id. 
25 Dolovich, supra note 8, at 457. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 507. 
29 See Exec. Order No. 12,803, 57 Fed. Reg. 19,063 §§ 2–3 (Apr. 30, 1992), reprinted in 31 
U.S.C. § 501 app. at 39 (2006). 
30 See BRIGETTE SARABI & EDWIN BENDER, THE PRISON PAYOFF: THE ROLE OF POLITICS 
AND PRIVATE PRISONS IN THE INCARCERATION BOOM 7–9 (2000). 
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 The U.S. houses the greatest number of prisoners of any nation,31 thus 
the actual total number of U.S. prisoners housed in private facilities is the 
highest in the world.32 However, the overall percentage of U.S. state and 
federal prisoners held in private prisons is relatively low (8.4% in 2014).33 
However, this relatively low aggregate number also masks variation across 
U.S. states. As of 2014, 20 states did not house any prisoners in private state 
facilities, while 10 more states held less than 5% of their state’s prison 
population in private facilities.34 In addition to geographic variation in the 
impacts of prison privatization in the US, there are also demographic 
disparities. Within U.S. state and federal prisons, there is an 
overrepresentation of the impoverished,35 people of color,36 and individuals 
with mental health disorders.37 The human rights issues laid out in this Article 
likely have a magnified impact on these marginalized populations. 
Internationally, the use of private prisons has varied and will be detailed in 
the next section. 
III. CASE STUDY: LEGAL CHALLENGE TO PRIVATE PRISONS IN ISRAEL 
Despite the fact that the U.S. houses the greatest number of prisoners 
in private prisons, as of 2013, Australia, New Zealand, Scotland, Wales, and 
England had proportionally higher numbers of privately held prisoners.38 
Internationally, at least 11 other countries operate some form of private 
prisons.39 These countries include: England, Scotland, Wales, Germany, 
France, South Africa, New Zealand, Australia, Japan, Brazil, and Chile.40 
However, the degree of privatization varies within these countries. England, 
Scotland, Wales, South Africa, New Zealand, and Australia operate a high 
                                                          
31 Tyjen Tsai & Paola Scommegna, U.S. Has World’s Highest Incarceration Rate, PRB (Aug. 
10, 2012), https://www.prb.org/us-incarceration/. 
32 Cody Mason, International Growth Trends in Prison Privatization, THE SENT'G 
PROJECT (Aug. 20, 2013), www.sentencingproject.org/publications/international-growth-
trends-in-prison-privatization/. 
33 Id. 
34 CARSON, supra note 6, at 14. 
35 See JEFFREY REIMAN & PAUL LEIGHTON, THE RICH GET RICHER AND THE POOR GET 
PRISON 237 (Routledge 2016) (2001). 
36 Alfred Blumstein, On the Racial Disproportionality of United States' Prison Populations, 
73 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY 1259, 1259 (1982). 
37 See Seth J. Prins, Prevalence of Mental Illnesses in U.S. State Prisons, 65 PSYCHIATRIC 
SERV. 862, 862 (2014). 
38 Mason, supra note 32. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
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percentage of completely privatized prisons.41 The remainder of the countries 
using privatized prisons operate some blend of private-public partnership.42 
Despite this rapid proliferation, Israel and several U.S. states have taken a 
legal stand against private prisons through legal rulings, state legislation, and 
refusal to commodify their prisons. 
IV. PRIVATE PRISONS IN ISRAEL 
In 2009, the Israeli Supreme Court ruled that private prisons violate 
the human right of dignity.43 This ruling came after the passage of the 2004 
Prisons Ordinance Amendment Law, or Amendment 28.44 Amendment 28 
established the creation of a single prison which would be operated via 
private contract.45 The Court’s argument against the amendment was based 
on the idea that the privatization of prisons commodifies the prisoner, which 
inherently violates their rights to dignity and liberty.46 A related thread of this 
argument was the prohibition of privatizing core government powers.47 This 
argument was brought before the Costa Rican Constitutional Court in 2004. 
However, the Costa Rican Constitutional Court dismissed the argument due 
to the fact that only the construction of the prison was privatized, not the core 
function of operating the facility.48 
The Israeli Court decision was based on the violation of their Basic 
Law: Human Dignity and Liberty of the State of Israel.49 According to this 
Israeli law, the constitutional right to dignity and liberty can only be violated 
to further essential public interests.50 Therefore, it was necessary to couple 
                                                          
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 HCJ 2605/05 Academic Center of Law & Business v. Minister of Finance, 27, 27 (2009) 
(Isr.). 
44 Id. 
45 Prisons Ordinance Amendment Law (no. 28), 5764–2004, SH No. 1935 (Isr.) (set aside 
2013). 
46 William Paul Simmons & Leonard Hammer, Privatization of Prisons in Israel and 
Beyond: A Per Se Violation of the Human Right to Dignity, 13 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 487, 
488 (2015). 
47 Barak Medina, Constitutional Limits to Privatization: The Israeli Supreme Court Decision 
to Invalidate Prison Privatization, 8 INT'L J. CONST. L. 690, 699 (2010). 
48 Richard Harding, State Monopoly of ‘Permitted Violation of Human Rights’: The Decision 
of the Supreme Court of Israel Prohibiting the Private Operation and Management of 
Prisons, 14 PUNISHMENT & SOC'Y 131, 143 n.3 (2012). 
49 HCJ 2605/05 Academic Center of Law & Business v. Minister of Finance, 27, 57 (2009) 
(Isr.). 
50 Id. at 28. 
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the violation of human rights argument with that of a transfer of the core 
function of the state, known as delegation. The Israeli Court ruled that the 
delegation of the state power to restrict a person’s liberty necessarily strips a 
person of their right to dignity.51 This was the first time that this argument 
had been used anywhere as a legal challenge to private prisons.52  
V. PRIVATE PRISONS IN THE US 
 The legal arguments used in Israel and Costa Rica have not been 
attempted in the U.S.53 Additionally, those arguments against private prisons 
that have been attempted have not been successful.54 As a result, within the 
US, the successful opposition to private prisons has come in the form of state 
law.55 Past legal scholars in the U.S. have examined the potential for the non-
delegation doctrine to be used in the U.S. to challenge private prisons.56 As 
no direct case law in the U.S. exists for this challenge, these authors presented 
arguments for potentially applicable case law and critiqued its use in this 
context.57 While scholars disagree about the utility of applying a non-
delegation based challenge, they have not examined its potential in 
conjunction with a human rights approach, as used in Israel.  
In 1990, Illinois passed the Private Correctional Facility Moratorium 
Act, which states that administration of correctional facilities is inherently 
governmental due to the obligatory use of coercive police powers which 
cannot be privatized.58 The argument presented in the Illinois statute is 
similar to that made in the Costa Rican Constitutional Court.59 The Illinois 
law also cites issues of liability, accountability, and cost as prohibitive factors 
in the decommodification of the state prison system.60 However, the law 
explicitly makes exception for specialized residential juvenile facilities, 
                                                          
51 Id. at 27–28. 
52 Harding, supra note 48, at 134.  
53 Id. 
54 See Joseph E. Field, Making Prisons Private: An Improper Delegation of a Governmental 
Power, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 649, 657–60 (1987). 
55 Id. 
56 See generally Lucas Anderson, Kicking the National Habit: The Legal and Policy 
Arguments for Abolishing Private Prison Contracts, 39 PU. CONT. L.J. 113, 114–39 (2009); 
see also Field, supra note 54. 
57 Id. 
58 730 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 140/2 (West 2012).  
59 See Harding, supra note 48. 
60 730 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 140/3 (West 2012). 
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work-release programs, and service provision within correctional centers.61 
This exception is in line with the previously discussed historical exceptions 
for these types of carve outs within the U.S. prison system. 
New York followed with their own 2007 law prohibiting the private 
ownership or operation of correctional facilities.62 The sponsoring senator of 
the New York law stated “public safety should never be linked to private-
sector profit motives.”63 Although not explicitly stated within the statute, this 
argument against the privatization of prisons is similar to that employed in 
Israel, in that the linking of profits to incarceration inherently commodifies 
the prisoner. 
Additionally, both New Hampshire and Vermont have proposed state 
bills to ban private prisons.64 Most recently, in 2015, Senator Bernie Sanders 
introduced a bill into the U.S. Senate to ban private prisons.65 In a press 
release discussing the bill, Senator Sanders implied that human dignity and 
liberty cannot be upheld in a for-profit prison.66 Finally, while other U.S. 
states have not adopted laws banning the privatization of prisons, many have 
nonetheless failed to privatize their prisons. 
VI. HUMAN DIGNITY 
 Despite its widespread use to justify legal rulings, human dignity 
remains a vague legal concept.67 The origins of the word dignity trace back 
to the Romans, who commonly used dignity to denote status, which afforded 
respect and honor.68 This understanding of status was not inherently linked 
to a person and was often used to refer to the state.69 Less commonly, the 
Romans used dignity to denote a special status unique to humans, where this 
status indicated an inherent worth of the person.70 It is this second definition 
                                                          
61 Id. 
62 Michael F. Nozzolio, Nozzolio Bill Signed into Law Prohibits For-profit Prisons in New 
York, N.Y. STATE SENATE (Aug. 1, 2007) https://www.nysenate.gov/newsroom/in-the-
news/michael-f-nozzolio/nozzolio-bill-signed-law-prohibits-profit-prisons-new-york. 
63 Id. 
64 H.B. 443-FN, 2013  Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2013); H.B. 28, 2013 Leg. Sess. (Vt. 2013). 
65 S. Res. 2054, 2015 Leg., 114th Cong. (2015) (enacted). 
66 John Wagner, Sanders to Push a Plan to Ban Private Companies from Running Prisons, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 2015. 
67 Doron Shultziner & Itai Rabinovici, Human Dignity, Self-Worth, and Humiliation: A 
Comparative Legal–Psychological Approach, 18 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y Law 105 (2012). 
68 McCrudden, supra note 14, at 656–57. 
69 Id. at 657. 
70 Id. 
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which pertains to the widespread modern legal use of dignity to confer human 
rights. 
 Dignity as a concept denoting special rights to humans entered legal 
doctrines in the early 1900s.71  From this time forward, as new constitutions 
were drafted, dignity was often explicitly incorporated as a central tenet 
guaranteeing human rights.72 Countries incorporating dignity in their 
constitutions included: Mexico (1917), Weimar Germany (1919), Finland 
(1919), Portugal (1933), Ireland (1937), Cuba (1940), Spain (1945), Japan 
(1946), Italy (1948), West Germany (1949), India (1950), and Israel (1992).73 
The original charter of the UN also explicitly declared dignity to be a human 
right within its Universal Declaration of Human Rights.74 Dignity has 
continued to be a central tenet of UN guidelines for human rights.75 Despite 
the widespread use of dignity as a human right, there are differences in how 
dignity is defined. Given these differences, it is important to distinguish how 
Israel and the U.S. define dignity.  
VII. HUMAN DIGNITY & ISRAELI LAW 
 The first time that dignity was used in Israeli legal texts was in the 
1980 case Katalan v. Prison Authority.76 This case used language similar to 
what would later become the Basic Law on Human Dignity and Liberty.77 
The ruling in the case mandated that all people in Israel have the right to 
dignity, including prisoners.78 The passage of the Basic Law on Human 
Dignity and Liberty in 1992, makes Israel unique as it is one of the few places 
that explicitly guarantees dignity as a human right.79  The stated purpose of 
the law is to “protect human dignity.”80 In order to achieve this purpose, the 
law outlines 10 basic human rights guaranteed to all people in Israel, and 
explicitly states that imprisonment does not void these rights.81 The passage 
                                                          
71 Id. at 664. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 664–65. 
74 Id. at 667.  
75 Id. at 669. 
76 HCJ 355/79 Katalan v. Prison Authority, 34(3) PD 294 (1980) (Isr.).   
77 Id. at 304; see Prisons Ordinance Amendment Law (no. 28), 5764–2004, SH No. 1935 
(Isr.) (set aside 2013). 
78 HCJ 355/79 Katalan v. Prison Authority, 34(3) PD 294, 304 (1980) (Isr.).  
79 Id. 
80 See Prisons Ordinance Amendment Law (no. 28). 
81 Id. 
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of this law sparked a trend in judicial activism in which dignity was used as 
the legal basis to protect human rights.82 The successful 2009 legal challenge 
to private prisons was among this trend.83 The function of the Israeli Basic 
Law on Human Dignity and Liberty is similar to that of the U.S. Bill of 
Rights. 
VIII. HUMAN DIGNITY & U.S. LAW 
 Legal scholars in the U.S. have argued that like the Israeli law, the 
very purpose of the U.S. Bill of Rights is to safeguard human dignity.84 There 
are also three U.S. states which explicitly include a right to dignity: 
Louisiana, Illinois, and Montana.85 The Puerto Rican Constitution also 
contains a dignity clause.86 Louisiana’s section on dignity prevents 
unreasonably discriminatory laws, involuntary servitude, and slavery–except 
for prisoners.87 The Constitution of Illinois’ section on dignity condemns 
hateful communication.88 Montana’s dignity clause protects all people from 
discrimination from any entity, without exception.89 Puerto Rico’s dignity 
clause is almost identical to Montana’s because Montana used Puerto Rico’s 
clause as a model for their own.90 
Within the US, this human right to dignity has been explicitly 
extended to prisoners, as evidenced by the establishment of case law on the 
subject. The 8th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution prohibits the use of cruel 
and unusual punishment.91 Furthermore, cruel and unusual punishment was 
directly linked with a failure to uphold the human dignity of the prisoner by 
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Brennan in his concurring opinion in Furman v. 
Georgia.92 Case law has recognized the human rights of prisoners through 
dignity in U.S. courts in at least three other instances. In the 1974 U.S. 
                                                          
82 See generally Shultziner & Rabinovici, supra note 67, at 37–40.  
83 HCJ 2605/05 Academic Center of Law & Business v. Minister of Finance, 27, 27 (2009) 
(Isr.). 
84 Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Dialogue and Human Dignity: States and Transnational 
Constitutional Discourse, 65 MONT. L. REV. 15, 17; see also Shultziner & Rabinovici, supra 
note 67, at 20. 
85 Jackson, supra note 84, at 21, n.21. 
86 Id. at 22. 
87 LA. CONST. art. I, § 3. 
88 ILL. CONST. art. I, § 20. 
89 MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4. 
90 Jackson, supra note 84, at 22. 
91 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
92 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 270 (1972) (concurrence). 
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Supreme Court Case, Procunier v. Martinez, the justices stated that, “the 
needs for identity and self-respect are more compelling in the dehumanizing 
prison environment.”93 Twenty years later the court, in Farmer v. Brennan, 
ruled that prisoners shall retain their right to self-esteem,94 which scholars 
have argued, equates to dignity.95 Recently, there has been a return to the use 
of dignity in U.S. jurisprudence as exemplified by the 2011 U.S. Supreme 
Court ruling in Brown v. Plata. In this case Justice Kennedy explicitly stated 
that, “prisoners retain the essence of human dignity.”96 This recent shift 
toward the recognition of the dignity of prisoners in U.S. case law suggests a 
possible shift toward penal reform.97 This case law provides the foundation 
for which U.S. prisoners are guaranteed the right to dignity. However, it does 
not explicitly describe the ways in which it might be violated. By borrowing 
from Epsing-Anderson’s decommodification theory, we can explore how 
privatization of prisons can lead to the loss of dignity for prisoners. 
IX. COMMODIFICATION OF PRISONERS & DECOMMODIFICATION THEORY 
In a capitalist society, individuals rely on the market to access goods 
and services necessary for survival.98 Inherent in this exchange is the 
commodification of either the individual, the services, or both.99 In this 
process a commodified individual becomes inherently objectified.100 In his 
seminal article on political economies, Esping-Andersen describes how the 
decommodification of individuals is necessary in order to grant them social 
rights.101 In a privatized prison system, both the prisoners and state asset of 
the prison system are commodified, thereby violating human rights. 
An example which elucidates the commodification of prisoners 
within private prisons is the recent “Cash for Kids” scandal in the state of 
Pennsylvania.102 In this situation, two judges accepted millions of dollars’ 
                                                          
93 Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 428 (1974). 
94 Farmer v. Bernann, 511 U.S. 825, 853 (1994). 
95 McCrudden, supra note 14, at 667. 
96 Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 510 (2011). 
97 David A. Green, US Penal-reform Catalysts, Drivers, and Prospects, 17 PUNISHMENT & 
SOC'Y 271, 271 (2015). 
98 See Esping-Andersen, supra note 10, at 100–105. 
99 See id. 
100 See id. 
101 See generally id. 
102 Sarah L. Primrose, When Canaries Won't Sing: The Failure of the Attorney Self-Reporting 
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worth of bribes to deny juveniles counsel, over sentence them, and send them 
to private detention centers who benefitted from increased profits.103 This 
example illustrates how the financial incentives inherent in private prisons 
stripped children of their fundamental right to liberty and dignity. 
Corruption certainly exists within the public sector; as an example, 
the judge in the “Cash for Kids” scandal was a public servant. However, the 
public sector is designed to eliminate opportunities for financial exploitation 
and has a more robust system of checks and balances than the private sector. 
The system of for-profit privatized prisons also creates additional financial 
incentives which do not exist in the private sector. These financial incentives 
create new opportunities and motivations for human rights abuses of 
prisoners. Continued vigilance is required to continue to protect prisoners 
from new forms of potential abuse, such as those posed by commodification 
and the resultant loss of dignity. 
Additionally, even without the involvement of corruption, the very 
nature of a for-profit, publicly traded prison corporation acts to commodify 
both the prisoner and the state asset of the prison. As stocks in these 
corporations are bought and sold for financial gain, the human prisoner 
becomes a product which is literally traded for financial gain. Percent 
contained occupancy rates are a common component of private prison state 
contracts which also lead to the commodification of prisoners. These 
contractual obligations specify the number of prisoners which the state must 
supply to the private prison. States which fail to meet this obligation face 
financial penalties.104 These policies also clearly commodify the prisoner, 
essentially turning them into a product which is demanded by the prison 
corporation and must be supplied by the state. Additionally, where the prison 
itself is owned or operated by a private corporation, both the asset and the 
function become commodified. This process also acts to strip prisoners of 
their dignity through allowing a non-state agent to restrict their rights which, 
under other circumstances, would be a criminal act. 
Under the decommodification theory, the system of commodifying 
prisoners and prisons inherently strips prisoners of their social rights.105 
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Additionally, the system also incentivizes the further restriction of prisoners’ 
human rights through the creation of financial disincentives for reform. 
Private prisons create an entire economic complex which profits off of 
incarceration. The prison industrial complex includes shareholders of prison 
corporations, employees of the corporations/institutions themselves, and the 
communities surrounding the institutions.106 Economic beneficiaries of this 
complex are thereby disincentivized to support criminal justice reforms 
which reduce sentences or recidivism.  
CONCLUSION 
 Examining the potential for human rights violations of private prisons 
addresses the very essence of whether prisons should be privatized in a 
democratic society, such as the US, with guaranteed human rights. 
Historically, the U.S. has relied on private prisons to reduce costs associated 
with its enormous prison population. However, within the U.S. there has been 
resistance to the privatization of prisons. In early 2017, the Obama 
administration issued an executive order to phase out the use of private 
prisons—an order that was later rescinded by the new incoming Attorney 
General. This occurred in Illinois and New York. National legislation and 
state legislation, in New Hampshire and Vermont, has also been proposed. 
Moving forward, using dignity as a foundation for ongoing legislative 
advocacy could also be fruitful, as it cuts to the very core of the argument 
against private prisons. This argument also has a history of success, and 
therefore serves as a promising foundation for future legislative efforts to 
curb the use of private prisons in the U.S. 
 By connecting decommodification theory with legal analysis, this 
Article has also described how Israel’s 2009 ruling could apply in a U.S. 
context. The Israeli argument was unique in that it coupled a constitutional 
argument regarding human rights violations with the non-delegation doctrine. 
This argument describes how prison privatization serves to strip prisoners of 
the human right to dignity by commodifying them and transferring a core 
power of the state to a private entity. This was the first time this argument 
had been legally made.  
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 The success of the 2009 Israeli argument established a template which 
demonstrates how private prisons can legally violate human rights. This 
ruling has paved the way for other jurisdictions with similar legal definitions 
of dignity to adapt this legal argument to their judicial context. Louisiana, 
Montana, and Puerto Rico all have dignity clauses in their constitutions, 
which could be used to legally challenge the constitutionality of private 
prisons. While such an argument would need to be tailored to the specific 
statutory language of the state constitution, enough similarities exist that 
there is potential for a successful case. Additionally, at a national level, the 
argument could be made using a mix of constitutional and case law. In 
summary, the movement to end private prisons in the U.S. could benefit from 
incorporating a dignity and human rights framework into both the creation of 
new laws and in future judicial challenges. Given the success that this 
framework has had in Israel, U.S. legal scholars should incorporate lessons 
learned from the Israeli case into future legal arguments. 
